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CHIARA BONUGLIA 
ATTICUS ON THE STATUS OF PLATONIC IDEAS 
ABSTRACT: Atticus’ fragments clearly testify that his commitment to a literal 
interpretation of the Timaeus along the lines of the craftsman model. Atticus assumed the 
three-principled theory according to which God, ideas-paradigms, and matter are the 
‘causes’ of the sensible world. Nevertheless, the role of the παράδειγμα within metaphysical 
reality is difficult to define, especially because when Atticus refers to ideas, he seems to 
support, on one hand, the idea that Forms coincide to god’s thoughts but, on the other 
hand, he seems to refuse this identification. This issue is complicated by the fact that 
Atticus refers to ideas as παραίτια (collateral causes: fr. 9). This expression doesn’t allude 
to a downgrading of ideas – as some scholars have argued – but it regards only the 
cosmological causation.  
SOMMARIO: I frammenti di Attico testimoniano chiaramente che Attico fu fedele a 
un’interpretazione letterale del Timeo sulla scorta del modello artigianale da lui adottato. 
Attico assunse la teoria dei tre principi secondo la quale il dio, le idee-paradigmi e la 
materia sono le ‘cause’ del mondo sensibile. Ciò nonostante, il ruolo del παράδειγμα 
all’interno della realtà metafisica è difficile da definire, specie perché quando Attico si 
riferisce alle idee, da una parte sembra supportare l’idea che le forme coincidono con i 
pensieri di dio; dall’altra parte, Attico sembra invece rifiutare questa identificazione. 
Quest’argomento è complicato dal fatto che Attico definisce le idee come παραίτια (cause 
collaterali: fr. 9). Questa espressione non allude a un declassamento delle idee – come 
alcuni studiosi hanno ritenuto – ma concerne soltanto la causalità cosmologica.  
KEYWORDS: Atticus; Middle Platonism; Ideas as Thoughts of God; Literalism; παραίτια 
Atticus’ stance on the nature of ideas is not entirely clear: we cannot 
reconstruct it with certainty from the texts that have come down to us. 
The first problem is an inconsistency between Atticus’ fragments and some 
other indirect testimonia on his doctrine. On the one hand, there would 
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seem to be enough material to conclude that Atticus viewed ideas as 
coinciding with god’s thoughts, as some middle Platonists did.1 So much 
can apparently be gathered from his fragments. On the other hand, 
however, even considering this interpretation sufficiently founded, it 
would nonetheless conflict with Atticus’ typically hyper-literal reading of 
Plato’s texts that assumes that ideas are totally independent, even from the 
demiurge.  
In what follows, I will deal in some more detail with Atticus’ view on 
the role of eidetic paradigm, considering all the testimonia where he refers 
to Plato’s ideas. I will quote in translation the evidences provided by 
Eusebius of Caesarea in his Praeparatio Evangelica,2 by Proclus in his 
Timaeus commentary, and by Syrianus in his Metaphysics commentary (= 
frr. 9, 34, 12, 28, 40 des Places). I will discuss these texts attempting to 
show that Atticus’ literal interpretation of Plato’s Timaeus implies the 
following consequences: a) Atticus is not committed to the doctrine of 
ideas as thoughts of god (or at least he is only committed to it in the special 
way I will clarify later in this paper); b) he views the paradigm as separated 
from the demiurge; c) he regards ideas as performing their causal action 
only in a secondary (or mediate) and non-essential way.  
The first reference to Atticus’ thesis that the demiurge is identical 
with the model can be found in fr. 9. This is the last of the fragments 
preserved in Eusebius’ Praeparatio Evangelica. In this text, Atticus accuses 
Aristotle of rejecting, endangering, and even trampling over Plato’s theory 
of ideas,3 whose necessity he is keen to emphasize. “The order of the 
intelligibles” (ἡ περὶ τῶν νοητῶν διάταξις), as he calls Plato’s theory of ideas, 
                                                            
1 Cf. Phil. Alex. De opif. mund. 19; Aët. Plac. I 3,21 e 10,3; Sen. Ep. 65,7. On the 
ideas as thoughts of the God, see M. Baltes, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios 
nach den Antiken Interpreten, vol. 1, Leiden, Brill, 1976; “Verso la costituzione del sistema: 
il medioplatonismo”, Paradigmi, 21, 2003, p. 345-354; Id., “L’esegesi medioplatonica del 
Timeo: metodi, finalità, risultati”, in F. Celia, A. Ulacco (eds.), Il Timeo: esegesi greche, 
arabe, latine, Pisa, Edizioni Plus – Pisa University Press, 2012, p. 81-131; M. Bonazzi, “Un 
lettore antico della Repubblica: Numenio di Apamea”, Méthexis, 17, 2004, p. 71-84; P. 
d’Hoine, A. Michalewski, “Ontologia ed epistemologia: le Idee e la partecipazione,” in. R. 
Chiaradonna, Filosofia tardoantica, Roma, Carocci, 2012, p. 173-191. G. Boys-Stones, 
Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2018, p. 
125-146. 
2 Eusebius of Caesarea in books 11 and 15 of his Praeparatio Evangelica quotes 
Atticus’ fragments of his Πρòς τοὺς διὰ τῶν ᾽Αριστοτέλους τὰ Πλάτωνος ὑπισχνουμένους. 
3 É. des Places, Atticus: fragments, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1977, fr. 9 (= Eus. Pr. Ev. 
XV, 13, 1-6, p. 67-69).  
Atticus on the Status of Platonic Ideas 
 57 
represents “the capital part, the strength of Plato’s school” (τὸ δὲ κεφάλαιον 
καὶ τὸ κῦρος τῆς Πλάτωνος αἱρέσεως). Here is what he claims:4  
The summit and the ultimate end of Plato’s philosophy is what concern this 
intelligible and eternal essence of Ideas (τὸ περὶ τὴν νοητὴν ταύτην καὶ ἀΐδιον οὐσίαν 
τὴν τῶν ἰδεῶν), where the soul must perform its ultimate effort and struggle. For 
those who participate in it and reach it are entirely happy, while those who fall 
behind cannot contemplate it and give up without taking part in happiness. Plato 
therefore makes every effort to show the strength of these natures. He claims that it 
is impossible to determine the cause of anything without participating in them, nor 
is knowledge of any truth possible without ascending towards them (i.e. the Ideas). 
Moreover, no one will be able to participate in reason if they will not agree on their 
existence.5 
In the same fragment Atticus goes on to say this: 
[Plato] understood that god is their father, craftsman, master and protector (πατέρα 
καὶ δημιουργὸν᾽ καὶ δεσπότην καὶ κηδεμόνα). Looking at a craftsman’s works, Plato 
came to understand that he first conceives (νοῆσαι) what he intends to realize and 
then goes on to make things similar to the model he has conceived. In the same way, 
he held that the thoughts of god (τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ νοήματα) precede things: models of all 
becoming things, incorporeal and intelligible, ‘always remaining identical with 
themselves’, existing entirely and primarily in themselves, collateral causes 
(παραίτια)6 of other things whose being is such that each of them exists because of its 
similarity to them [i.e. the Ideas]. In addition, Plato understood that all this is not 
easy to observe, nor it can be clearly manifested by means of discourse. Therefore, as 
if speaking of these subjects to those who were about to follow him, and thinking of 
them and preparing them, addressing these issues and founding his whole 
philosophy on them, he claims that it is on them [i.e. the Ideas] and on the 
knowledge of them that depend wisdom and science, which lead us to the human 
end and the happy life.7 
If we look at what Atticus says in fr. 9, particularly in the second part of it, 
we can conclude that his view of the παράδειγμα is pretty traditional. This 
means that this view seems to be perfectly in keeping with Plato’s standard 
theory of ideas, i.e. that ideas are the separated self-identical and 
                                                            
4 All translations from Greek into English are my own. 
5 Eus. Pr. Ev. XV, 13, 2-3 (= Att. fr. 9 des Places). 
6 Des Places translates the Greek noun παραίτια as ‘partial causes’: cf. des Places, 
Atticus: fragments, p. 69. The literal meaning of the word is ‘be complicit’, ‘have one’s 
share of responsibility’. This is why I chose to render it as ‘collateral cause’. For an 
overview of the occurrences of παραίτια before Atticus, see A. Michalewski, La puissance 
de l’intelligible. La théorie plotinienne des Formes au miroir de l’héritage médioplatonicien, 
Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2014, p. 81-84. 
7 Eus. Pr. Ev. XV, 13, 5 (= Att. fr. 9 des Places). 
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unchanging models as well as the paradigmatic causes of every created 
thing. This crops up a problem, however, as to the making of the cosmos. 
We have to ask how ideas can function as a model for the plurality of 
generated things and what their position is with respect to the demiurge. 
About this problem we should firstly clarify what Atticus means by 
‘creation’. The first reference must be to the Timaeus, which he interprets 
literally. ‘Literalism’ towards Plato’s texts was not by chance a typical 
feature of Atticus’ philosophy, and it led him to understand the making of 
the cosmos by the demiurge as a fact taking place in time. Atticus and, on 
this count, Plutarch, became famous for holding that the creation of the 
cosmos occurred κατὰ χρόνον or ἐν χρόνῳ, i.e. that the world was made by 
the demiurge at a certain point in time before which there was nothing but 
undifferentiated matter (ὕλη) moving in a chaotic and disorderly way 
(ἄτακτος).8 Based on the claim in Phaedrus 245c5 that the soul is by 
definition a self-moving entity, and on Plato’s references in the Laws (X, 
892a-c, 896d-e, 898c) to the existence of an evil soul, Atticus regarded pre-
cosmic matter as moved by a chaotic and irrational soul, ἄλογος ψυχή. Only 
the action of the divine soul (θεία ψυχή)9 could finally enable the world soul 
to become a rational soul (λογικὴ ψυχή), ungenerated with respect to its 
substrate (ἀγένητος κατὰ τὸ ὑποκείμενον) and generated with respect to its 
form (γενητὴ κατὰ εἶδος)10. All of this plays a crucial role when it comes to 
Atticus’ view on the status of ideas.  
                                                            
8 On Plutarch see P. Thévenaz, L’âme du monde, le devenir et la matière chez 
Plutarque, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1938; L. Brisson, Le même et l’autre dans la structure 
ontologique du Timée de Platon, Paris, Klincksieck, 1974, p. 58-64; F. Ferrari, “La teoria 
delle idee in Plutarco”, Elenchos, 27, 1996, p. 121-142. On Atticus, see Baltes, Die 
Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios, p. 38-45; F. Ferrari, L. Baldi (eds.), La 
generazione dell’anima nel Timeo, Napoli, D’Auria, 2002-2006; G.-E. Karamanolis, Plato 
and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford, 
Clarendon, 2006, p. 85-126, F. Ferrari, “Materie, Seele und Bewegung vor der 
Weltentstehung: Plutarch und Attikos als Interpreten des Platonischen Timaios”, in J. 
Halfwassen, T. Dangel, C. O’Brien (eds.), Seele und Materie im Neuplatonismus – Soul 
and Matter in Neoplatonism, Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag, 2016, p. 26-54; F.-M. 
Petrucci, “ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν ῥεματων: The Neoplatonic Criticism of Atticus’ Exegesis of 
Plato’s Cosmology”, in Halfwassen, Dangel, O’Brien (eds.), Seele und Materie, p. 75-103. 
9 Cf. Att. fr. 35. 3 (des Places). 
10 On the temporal interpretation and the related issue of the nature of the soul, cf. 
Att. fr. 4 and 8; Iambl. fr. 10 and 11; Procl. frr. 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 29, 30, 31, 
35 (des Places); Iohan. Philop. fr. 38a, 38b, 39 (des Places). More specifically, for the 
literal-temporal reading see Baltes’ extensive treatment of Atticus’ interpretation of the 
meaning of γέγονεν: Baltes, Die Weltentstehung, particularly p. 45-63. Useful in 
understanding the use of this verb is Calvenus Taurus’ discussion of γενητόν as πολλαχῶς 
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As I said earlier, from fragment 9 we can infer that what the demiurge 
does when he sets out to frame the cosmos is nothing but an adjustment, 
i.e. he makes the chaotic pre-cosmic reality resemble the model he has 
conceived. According to this fragment, then, the demiurge has primarily in 
himself an eidetic conception. By contrast, no reference is made to him 
directing his gaze to the world of ideas, as it is claimed in Timaeus 28a. This 
being so, we could be tempted to subscribe to the view that the demiurge 
has the παράδειγμα in himself. 11 Yet, the text does not make explicit that he 
contains the ideas; it just says that he possesses a conception that precedes 
creation. A brief discussion of the word παραίτια will be in order here. Its 
translation as ‘collateral cause’ is in my view extremely significant. The 
word refers to the thoughts of god, regarded as the paradigms of becoming 
things, as incorporeal, intelligible and always identical with themselves (frr. 
9, 5, 40-43). For these are undoubtedly the traditional characteristics of 
ideas, it would seem right to support the thesis that ideas are the thoughts 
of god. Yet, there is a problem. If Atticus were referring to ideas as identical 
with the thoughts of god, why should he ever have called them ‘collateral 
causes’ (παραίτια) and not, properly speaking, just ‘causes’ (αἴτια)? At least 
two answers can be given to this question. Either, (A) Atticus was thinking 
of the fact that ideas cannot be the direct cause of becoming, since they 
need the help of the demiurge who, in virtue of his intellect, can conceive 
them and ‘translate’ them into the world of becoming (and thus giving 
them the role of ‘collateral causes’). Or, (B) the word παραίτια has to be 
taken as referred to the thoughts of god, which are the collateral – or 
partial – causes of becoming alongside the actual causes, i.e. ideas. For what 
regards the existence of ideas, we should not forget that Atticus himself 
repeatedly claims that they are necessary.12 We can conclude that the 
                                                                                                                                           
λεγόμενον: cf. Iohan. Philop. Aet. mund. 121, 18-21; 145,1-147,25 (Rabe). See also des 
Places, Atticus: fragments, p. 15-17; J. Dillon, The Middle Platonists 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, 
Ithaca-New York, Cornell University Press, 1977, p. 237-247; Karamanolis, Plato and 
Aristotle in Agreement?, p. 179-185. Further discussions of Atticus’ and Plutarch’s 
interpretations of the Timaeus are to be found in des Places, Atticus: fragments, p. 10-15. 
On Atticus’ psychology, see M. Zambon, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme, Paris, Vrin, 
2002, p. 161-169. See also F.-M. Petrucci, “Argumentative Strategies for Interpreting 
Plato’s Cosmogony: Taurus and the Issue of Literalism in Antiquity”, Phronesis, 61, 2016, 
p. 43-59. 
11 Cf. C. Moreschini, “Attico: una figura singolare nel medioplatonismo”, ANRW, 
36 (1), 1987, p. 477-491: 488-489. 
12 In addition to holding that the doctrine of ideas is “the summit and the ultimate 
end of Plato’s philosophy”, Atticus defined Ideas as τὰς πρώτας φύσεις (‘first realities’) and 
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passage preserved by Eusebius fails to unambiguously clarify Atticus’ view 
on the status of ideas.  
Proclus’ testimony (fr. 34)13 explicitly addresses the above-mentioned 
problem and asks what, according to Atticus, is the relationship between 
the ‘Living being in itself’ (τὸ αὐτοζῷον) and the demiurge. The text reads as 
follows: 
As regards these things, Atticus asked whether the demiurge is embraced [i.e. 
comprised] by the intelligible living being (ὁ δημιουργὸς ὑπὸ τοῦ νοητοῦ ζῴου 
περιέχεται). For it seems that, were he embraced by it, he could not be perfect. Partial 
living beings – he claims – are imperfect, and this is why those who resemble them 
are not beautiful. On the other hand, were the demiurge not embraced, the living 
being in itself would no longer be the most comprehensive of all the intelligibles (οὐ 
πάντων τῶν νοητῶν εἶναι τὸ αὐτοζῷον περιληπτικώτερον). Confronted with this issue, 
Atticus easily ended up viewing the demiurge as superior to the living being in itself 
(ὑπὲρ τὸ αὐτοζῷον).14 
According to Proclus’ testimony, Atticus regards the demiurge superior to 
the living being in itself because it is more ‘comprehensive’.15 This would 
seem to confirm that in Atticus’ opinion the paradigm is in some way 
inferior to the demiurge. Even if this were the case, it would not be enough 
to demonstrate that the ideas coincide with the thoughts of god. If we were 
to regard the living being in itself as ‘embraced’16 by the demiurge, then, in 
the light of what we claimed above about the Ideas (i.e. that their existence 
is necessary and that they play a key role in determining any truth: fr. 9), we 
should consider the two as being on a par with each other, and refrain from 
subordinating one of them to the other. But, again, the assumption that 
the demiurge entirely coincides with the paradigm is far from 
unproblematic. A possible, formally conciliatory interpretation would be 
to maintain that Ideas, though not perfectly identical with the demiurge, 
coincide with intellect, which our evidence describes Atticus as 
distinguishing from the demiurgic soul. As to intellect, Proclus reports 
Porphyry’s view that Atticus equated it with the Good, i.e. with the 
                                                                                                                                           
ἀρχικωτάτας (‘principles in a supreme sense’): cf. Att. fr. 9, 32 (des Places). This claim was 
a part of his criticism of Aristotle.  
13 Cf. Procl. In Tim. I. 431, 14-20, in A.-J. Festugière (éd.), Proclus, Commentaire sur 
le Timée, Paris, Vrin, 1967, p. 156-157. 
14 Procl. In Tim. I, 431, 14-20 Diehl (= Att. fr. 34 des Places). 
15 On this see Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 254. 
16 The term ‘embrace’ translates the Greek verb περιέχω. It refers to the inclusion of 
something in something else and it can indicate a relationship of superiority or inferiority 
depending on who happens to embrace and be embraced. 
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supreme Idea of the Good mentioned in Plato’s Republic (VI, 509b9). It is 
not by chance that, within Proclus’ commentary, this testimony can be 
found in the section about the identity of the demiurge.17 The text reads as 
follows: 
Atticus […] identifies the demiurge with the good, although Plato calls the demiurge 
‘good’ (ἀγαθός), not ‘the Good’ (τἀγαθὸν δὲ οὔ), whereas the Intellect is called the 
good which is the cause of every essence beyond being (αἴτιον ἁπάσης οὐσίας καὶ 
ἐπέκεινα τοῦ ὄντος), as we learned in the Republic. For what could we say about the 
paradigm? Either it precedes the demiurge, hence it will be older than the good; or it 
is in the demiurge, hence the first will be many things (ἔσται πολλὰ τὸ πρῶτον);18 or it 
comes after the demiurge, and the Good – as we are not in the habit of saying – will 
turn towards what comes after itself and will think it (εἰς τὰ μετ᾽αὐτὸ ἐπιστραφήσεται 
κἀκεῖνα νοήσει).19 
Given its content and the language used by Proclus, this testimony would 
deserve a separate discussion. Since I cannot deepen this argument here, I 
will only take up Proclus’ reference to Atticus. If, as Proclus claims, the 
Good and the demiurge – or rather, the demiurgic Intellect – were one and 
the same thing, this would mean that the ideas are subordinate to god. In 
other words, equating the idea of the Good with the demiurgic intellect 
would turn god into a model for anything good in the sensible world and 
would ascribe to the demiurge the exemplarism that usually (i.e. in Plato) 
was a characteristic of the ideas.20 In order to bypass these consequences, it 
is necessary to clarify the issue of the identity of God with the Good. 
The demiurge coincides with the idea of the Good since it bestows on 
every created thing the goodness that he possesses by essence. It is only in 
this regard that the two can be equated,21 since the evidence I have quoted 
so far does not allow us to think that the very existence of the ideas depends 
on divine thought. What does depend on it, it is just the ability to form an 
intelligible conception of the ideas with a view to creating the cosmos, as 
                                                            
17 Cf. Festugière, Commentaire sur le Timée, p. 156-159.  
18 I.e. the Good and the Model (Festugière). Cf. Festugière, Commentaire sur le 
Timée, p. 159. 
19 Procl. In Tim. I, 305, 6-16 Diehl (= Att. fr. 12 des Places). 
20 Nor can it be argued that there are two Models, i.e. the Good (Intellect) and the 
Ideas. This could formally represent a solution to the problem, but from Atticus’ Platonic 
perspective it is quite unacceptable. 
21 As A. Michalewski aptly remarks, “le souci exégétique d’Atticus est de maintenir à 
la fois l’unité du Bien et la multiplicité des intelligibles. Si le Bien et l’intellect ne font 
qu’un, la multiplicité intelligible ne peut être qu’extérieure au dieu”; cf. Michalewski, La 
puissance de l’intelligible, p. 78. 
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we saw in fr. 9 (35 ff.). A passage by Proclus, who quotes Porphyry’s 
criticism of Atticus’ conception of the ideas, supports the view that ideas 
exist independently of the demiurge: 
The third point is that the creator, whom they assume as a principle, does not belong 
to Plato. For, according to Plato, ideas are not in themselves separate from the 
intellect of the demiurge, but the intellect, once it has turned towards itself (εἰς 
ἑαυτὸν ἐπεστραμμένος), sees (i.e. in itself) all the forms. This is why the Athenian 
stranger22 compared the activity of the intellect with the revolution of ‘a round 
sphere’. [Atticus] regards ideas as existing in themselves and outside intellect (ἔξω τοῦ 
νοῦ), inert and resembling the figures of statuette-makers. Nor (i.e. according to 
Plato) is the demiurge the first god, for the latter is superior to all intelligible essence. 
Nor is the soul something irrational that moves what is carried about ‘in an irregular 
and disorderly way’. For the whole soul is a product of god. Nor finally does the 
universe become orderly from disorder.23 
According to Proclus, the reason why Porphyry criticizes Atticus is that he 
separated Forms form the demiurgic Intellect and made them lifeless. Once 
again, the argument quoted by Proclus can only be made sense of on the 
assumptions of Neoplatonic philosophy. However, if we focus the 
reference to Atticus, we can find a confirmation of his commitment to a 
literal interpretation of the theory of Ideas, along the lines of the 
traditional Platonism he undoubtedly championed.24 
The last Atticus’ reference to Ideas can be found in the Metaphysics 
commentary of the neoplatonist Syrianus.25 The problem of the 
dependence of Ideas on god seems here to be in some respects even more 
complex. Syrianus claims that Atticus viewed Ideas as λόγοι residing in the 
divine soul. Here is the passage: 
                                                            
22 The reference here is to Laws X, 898 b2: cf. des Places, Atticus: fragments, p. 77.  
23 Procl. In Tim. Ι, 393, 31-394, 12 Diehl (= Att. fr. 28 des Places). 
24 For evidences on Atticus’ ‘traditional’ view of ideas as exemplary causes, see Procl. 
In Tim. I, 366, 9-13 Diehl (Att. fr. 13 des Places.): “As the carpenter – Atticus claims – 
does in all his carpentry works, but according to a different model [he makes] a chair or a 
bed, so god, since he is good, renders all things like himself by making them beautiful, but 
according to the forms that are attributed to them he realizes for each of them its essence 
as a result of (i.e. based on) the paradigmatic causes” (῞Ωσπερ γάρ, φησὶν ᾽Αττικός, ὁ 
τέκτων πάντα μὲν τεκτονικὰ ποιεῖ, ἄλλα δὲ κατ᾽ἄλλον λόγον, τὸ μὲν βάθρον, τὸ δὲ κλίνην, οὕτω 
καὶ ὁ θεός, ᾗ μὲν ἀγαθός, ἐξομοιοῖ πάντα ἑαυτῷ, ἀγαθὰ ἀποτελῶν, κατὰ δὲ τὰ εἴδη τὰ μερίζοντα 
τὰς ἑκάστων οὐσίας ποιεῖ πρὸς τὰς παραδειγματικὰς αἰτίας). It should be noted that the 
carpenter analogy emphasizes that all created things are good because god is good. In this 
sense, then, all works are equal. Yet they are not equal to the point of being 
indistinguishable, for a different model is applied to each of them. 
25 Cf. Syr. In Arist. Metaph., CAG, VI, p. 105, 36-38 (Kroll); des Places, Atticus: 
fragments, p. 81. 
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Nor Plutarch nor Atticus nor Democritus – the Platonists – shall we imitate in this: 
i.e. when they equate ideas with such universal reasons as exist eternally in the 
essence of the soul (τοὺς καθόλου λόγους τοὺς ἐν οὐσίᾳ τῇ ψυχικῇ διαιωνίως ὑπάρχοντας 
ἡγοῦνται εἶναι τὰς ἰδέας).26 
Syrianus’ claim apparently raises a further problem regarding the location 
of Ideas, which are here regarded as existing in the divine psychic substance. 
We have to keep in mind that in Atticus’ opinion, Plato, unlike Aristotle, 
held that god cannot be a pure intellect (νοῦς), since there can be no 
intellect without a soul.27 The demiurge, therefore, possesses not only an 
Intellect, but also a soul. The suggestion that the soul is the ‘place’ of ideas 
represents a good exegetical solution to the problem of Atticus’ view on 
their ontological location, while, at the same time, it helps settling the issue 
of the “noetic conception of the demiurge”. The soul can think the ideas, 
which inevitably brings multiplicity into play.28 Intellect, by contrast, due 
to its absolute simplicity, can only guarantee that creation is good, thanks 
to its identification with the idea of the Good (fr. 12). This interpretation 
would allow us to account for fr. 9, where ideas are described as “thoughts 
of god”.29 It should be emphasized, however, that even if ideas are regarded 
                                                            
26 Syr. In. Arist. Metaph., CAG, VI, 1 p. 36-38 Kroll (= Att. fr. 40 des Places). 
27 See Att. fr. 8, 25-26: ὁ μὲν γὰρ [Πλάτων] φησι νοῦν ἄνευ ψυχῆς ἀδύνατον εἶναι 
συνίστασθαι; Plat. Tim. 30b3-5; Soph. 249a4-8. Atticus would seem to be criticizing 
Aristotle for separating the intellect from the soul. As Zambon points out, if the paradigm 
is thought to be outside the demiurge and identical with the immanent λόγοι that are ab 
aeterno in the soul, then, it can function as a mediator between God and the chaotic 
matter. This is because the soul is the principle of movement (αὐτοκίνητον), hence it can 
transform matter into an orderly cosmos. Just like Plato’s παντελῶς ὄν, Atticus’ demiurge is 
not a νοῦς ἁπλῶς, but a νοῦς ἐν ψυχῇ; producing the world, he comes to grips with a κίνησις 
that is proper to the soul. See Zambon, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme, p. 154-161. Baltes 
suggests that Atticus equates the demiurge’s divine soul, i.e. the indivisible essence of the 
Timaeus, with the οὐσία τῶν ἰδεῶν: cf. M. Baltes, “Zur Philosophie des Platonikers 
Attikos”, in H.-D. Blume, F. Mann (eds.), Platonismus un Christentum. Festschrift für 
Heinrich Dörrie (Jahrbuch für Antike unf Christentum, Ergänzungsband, 10) Münster, 
Aschendorff, 1983, p. 38-57, reprinted in A. Hüffemeier, M.-L. Lakmann, M. Vorwerk 
(eds.), ΔIANOHMATA. Kleine Schriften zu Platon und zum Platonismus, Stuttgart-
Leipzig, Teubner, 1999, p. 81-111.  
28 Due to their paradigmatic character, Forms/Ideas introduce multiplicity and 
require the existence of ‘something’ that can think them. Only from this point of view, 
then, they can be regarded as ‘thoughts of god’. See the clear discussion in Karamanolis, 
Plato and Aristotle in Agreement?, p. 170 and Ferrari, La teoria delle idee in Plutarco, p. 
129-130. See also Boys-Stones, Platonist Philosophy, p. 125-133.  
29 If – given what Atticus claims in fr. 28 – ideas are to have a separate ontological 
location from the demiurgic intellect, while at the same time being present in it, then a 
good solution is to place them in the soul. 
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as ‘thoughts’, this does not mean that the paradigm entirely coincides with 
the demiurge. The fact that they reside eternally in the soul (fr. 40) does 
not necessarily imply that their existence depends on the demiurge. Rather, 
god thinks them in virtue of his soul, and divine thought enables them to 
function as παραδείγματα for all becoming things30 (fr. 9). This 
interpretation implies the assumption of a difference between an 
ontological explanation and a cosmological one. It behoves us to make this 
distinction because is only in doing it that it’s possible to understand 
Atticus’ point of view. However, this difference is not clearly stated in 
Plato’s Timaeus but it underpins a typical trait of the ‘artificialist’ model 
embraced by a lot of ‘middleplatonists’.  
Conclusions 
The claim that ideas are the ‘thoughts of god’ does not imply – formally 
speaking – that the demiurge produces the model. Since we may plausibly 
argue that god can think a model he did not produce.31 Once they have 
been contemplated by the Intellect of the divine craftsman, the Forms are 
reflected in his soul and thus become ‘thoughts of god’, i.e. models for what 
becomes (τὰ τῶν γενομένων παραδείγματα). This interpretation rules out 
the possibility that Atticus subscribed to the thesis according to which 
Ideas are simply ‘thoughts of god’. Ideas retain all the necessary 
characteristics of the genuine Platonism, starting with their autarchic 
separateness and independence, not only with respect to the cosmos, but 
also to the demiurge. This because the demiurge, if he has to fashion the 
cosmos, must be able to grasp the ideas – which is exactly what fr. 9 from 
Eusebius32 claims, and this is in keeping with the Timaeus.33  
                                                            
30 This interpretation is endorsed with different degrees of conviction by Dillon and 
Karamanolis. See Dillon, The Middle Platonists, p. 256; Karamanolis, Plato and Aristotle 
in Agreement?, p. 168-170. See also J. Opsomer, “Demiurges in Early Imperial Platonism”, 
in R. Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2005, p. 
51-99; Ferrari, La teoria delle idee in Plutarco, p. 131-132. 
31 Michalewski, La puissance de l’intelligible, p. 78. 
32 Cf. Eus. Pr. Ev. XV, 13, 2-3 (fr. 9). 
33 Cf. Plat. Tim. 29a2-b2: “If this world is really beautiful, and the demiurge is really 
good, then it is evident that he directed his gaze to what is eternal; if not – which we are 
not even allowed to say – [he looked to] what is generated. Yet it is clear to all that he 
looked to what is eternal, since this world is the most beautiful of generated things and its 
maker the best of causes. Having been thus generated, it was modelled on what is grasped 
by reason and thought and remains identical with itself”. 
Atticus on the Status of Platonic Ideas 
 65 
Some people regarded the word παραίτια (fr. 9.43) as implying an 
ontological downgrading of ideas, and as a hint at the view that they are 
produced by the demiurge and thus subordinate to him; 34 others have 
suggested a Stoic influence on Atticus.35 Contrary to such speculations, I 
have shown that the three-principled doctrine is, in my opinion, perfectly 
acceptable, for it accords with Atticus’ commitment to the craftsman 
model and his literal interpretation of the Timaeus. Probably, Atticus was 
not much interested in establishing whether Ideas are ‘inside’ or ‘outside’ 
the demiurge. What certainly mattered to him was their function. In his 
view, Ideas firstly have a value in themselves whether or not they play a 
paradigmatic role with respect to the sensible world. From a secondary and 
‘collateral’ standpoint, they function as causes of the sensible world, since 
they are cosmologically subordinated to the first causal power: the 
demiurge36 (fr. 9. 35). 
REFERENCES: 
Baltes, Matthias, Die Weltentstehung des platonischen Timaios nach den Antiken 
Interpreten, vol. 1, Leiden, Brill, 1976. 
Baltes, Matthias, “Zur Philosophie des Platonikers Attikos”, in H.-D. Blume, F. Mann 
(eds.), Platonismus un Christentum. Festschrift für Heinrich Dörrie (Jahrbuch für 
Antike unf Christentum, Ergänzungsband, 10) Münster, Aschendorff, 1983, p. 38-
57. 
Baltes, Matthias, ΔIANOHMATA. Kleine Schriften zu Platon und zum Platonismus, ed. 
by Annette Hüffemeier, Marie-Luise Lakmann, Matthias Vorwerks, Stuttgart-
Leipzig, Teubner, 1999, p. 81-111. 
Baltes, Matthias-Dörrie, Heinrich, Der Platonismus in der Antike, Band III. Der 
Platonismus im 2. und 3. Jahrhundert nach Christus, Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, 
Fromann-Holzboog, 1993. 
Barnes, Jonathan, “Roman Aristotle”, in Jonathan Barnes, Miriam Griffin (eds.) 
Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, 1997. 
                                                            
34 See Moreschini, Attico, p. 489. H. Dörrie went so far as to speak of a ‘derealization’ 
of Ideas. He considered the words paraitia and sunaitia as synonymous and emphasized 
their instrumental value: see Michalewski, La puissance de l’intelligible, p. 83.  
35 Cf. Opsomer, Demiurges, p. 51-99; A. Michalewski, Faut-il préférer Epicure à 
Aristote? Quelques réflexions sur la providence, in F. Baghdassarian, G. Guyomarc’h (éds.), 
Réceptions de la théologie aristotéliciennes d’Aristote à Michel d’Ephèse, Leuven, Leuvain-la-
Neuve, Peeters, 2017, p. 108-123; F.-M. Petrucci, Taurus of Beirut. The Other Side of 
Middle Platonism, London-New York, Routledge, 2018, ch. 3. 
36 My interpretation is along the lines of that proposed by Baltes; see Baltes, 
ΔIANOHMATA, p. 94-95. Cf. also Michalewski, La puissance de l’intelligible, p. 81-84. 
Chiara Bonuglia 
 66 
Boys-Stones, George, Platonist Philosophy 80 BC to AD 250, Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2018. 
Bonazzi, Mauro-Chiaradonna, Riccardo, “Prima di Plotino: le correnti filosofiche in età 
imperiale”, in Riccardo Chiaradonna (ed.) Filosofia tardoantica, Roma, Carocci, 
2012. 
Brancacci, Aldo (ed.), La filosofia in età imperiale, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2000. 
Brisson, Luc, Le même et l’autre dans la structure ontologique du Timée de Platon, Paris, 
Klincksieck, 1974. 
Chiaradonna, Riccardo, “Interpretazione filosofica e ricezione del corpus. Il caso di 
Aristotele (100 a.C. – 250 d.C)”, in Lucio Del Corso, Paolo Pecere (eds.), Il libro 
filosofico. Dall’antichità al XXI secolo. Philosophy and the Books. From Antiquity to the 
XXIst Century, Quaestio, 11, 2011, p. 83-114. 
Chiaradonna, Riccardo, “Plotinus’ Account of Demiurgic Causation and its Philosophical 
Background”, in Anna Marmodoro, Brian D. Prince (eds.), Causation and Creation 
in Late Antiquity, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2015, p. 31-50. 
Chiaradonna, Riccardo, “Medioplatonismo e Aristotelismo”, Rivista di storia della 
filosofia, 2, 2015, p. 425-446. 
des Places, Édouard, Atticus: fragments, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 1977. 
D’Hoine, Pieter-Michalewski, Alexandra, “Ontologia ed epistemologia: le Idee e la 
partecipazione”, in Riccardo Chiaradonna (ed.), Filosofia tardoantica, Roma, 
Carocci, 2012, p. 173-191. 
Dillon, John, The Middle Platonists 80 B.C. to A.D. 220, Ithaca-New York, Cornell 
University Press, 1977 (19962). 
Donini, Pierluigi, Le scuole, l’anima, l’impero: la filosofia antica da Antioco a Plotino, 
Torino, Rosenberg & Sellier, 1982. 
Donini, Pierlugi, “Testo e commenti, manuali e insegnamento: la forma sistematica e i 
metodi della filosofia postellenistica”, ANRW, II, 36 (7) 1994, p. 5027-5100. 
Falcon, Andrea, “Aristotelianism in the First Century BC”, in Andrea Falcon (ed.), Brill’s 
Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in Antiquity, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2016. 
Falcon, Andrea, “Medioplatonismo e filosofi medioplatonici. Una raccolta di studi”, 
Elenchos, 11, 1990, p. 79-93. 
Ferrari, Franco, “La teoria delle idee in Plutarco”, Elenchos, 27, 1996, p. 121-142. 
Ferrari, Franco, “I commentari specialistici alle sezioni matematiche del Timeo”, in Aldo 
Brancacci (ed.), La filosofia in età imperiale, Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2000, p. 171-224. 
Ferrari, Franco, “Struttura e funzione dell’esegesi testuale nel medioplatonismo: il caso del 
Timeo”, Athenaeum, 89, 2001, p. 525-574. 
Ferrari, Franco, “Verso la costituzione del sistema: il medioplatonismo”, Paradigmi, 21, 
2003, p. 345-354. 
Ferrari, Franco, “Dottrina delle idee nel medioplatonismo”, in Francesco Fronterotta, 
Walter Leszl (eds.), Eidos – Idea. Platone, Aristotele e la tradizione platonica, Sankt 
Augustin, Academia Verlag, 2005, p. 233-246. 
Ferrari, Franco, Review of G.-E. Karamanolis [Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists 
on Aristotle from Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford, Clarendon, 2006], Elenchos, 31, 
2010, p. 359-369. 
Atticus on the Status of Platonic Ideas 
 67 
Ferrari, Franco, “L’esegesi medioplatonica del Timeo: metodi, finalità, risultati”, in 
Francesco Celia, Angela Ulacco (eds.), Il Timeo: esegesi greche, arabe, latine, Pisa, 
Edizioni Plus-Pisa University Press, 2012, p. 81-131. 
Ferrari, Franco, “Materie, Seele und Bewegung vor der Weltentstehung: Plutach und 
Attikos als Interpreten des Platonischen Timaios”, in Jens Halfwassen, Tobias 
Dangel, Carl O’Brien (eds.), Seele und Materie im Neuplatonismus – Soul and Matter 
in Neoplatonism, Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag, 2016, p. 26-54. 
Ferrari, Franco-Baldi, Laura (eds.), La generazione dell’anima nel Timeo, Napoli, D’Auria, 
2002-2006. 
Festugière, André-Jean, Proclus. Commentaire sur le Timée, Paris, Vrin, 1967. 
Frede, Michael, “Epilogue”, in Keimpe Algra, Jonathan Barnes, Jaap Mansfeld, Malcolm 
Schofield (eds.), The Cambridge History of Hellenistic Philosophy, Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1999, p. 771-797. 
Gioè, Adriano, Filosofi medioplatonici del II secolo d.C., Napoli, Bibliopolis, 2002. 
Hatzimichali, Myrto, “The Texts of Plato and Aristotle in the First Century BC”, in 
Malcolm Schofield (ed.), Aristotle, Plato and Pythagoreanism in the First Century 
BC. New Directions for Philosophy, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2013, p. 
1-27. 
Hatzimichali, Myrto, “Andronicus of Rhodes and the Construction of the Aristotelian 
Corpus”, in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle in 
Antiquity, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2016, p. 81-100. 
Karamanolis, George E., Plato and Aristotle in Agreement? Platonists on Aristotle from 
Antiochus to Porphyry, Oxford, Clarendon, 2006. 
Merlan, Philip, From Platonism to Neoplatonism, The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1953, 
19602. 
Michalewski, Alexandra, La puissance de l’intelligible. La théorie plotinienne des Formes au 
miroir de l’héritage médioplatonicien, Leuven, Leuven University Press, 2014. 
Michalewski, Alexandra, The Reception of Aristotle in Middle Platonism (from Eudorus to 
Ammonius Saccas), in A. Falcon (ed.), Brill’s Companion to the Reception of Aristotle 
in Antiquity, Leiden-Boston, Brill, 2016, p. 218-237. 
Michalewski, Alexandra, “Faut-il préférer Epicure à Aristote ? Quelques réflexions sur la 
providence”, in Fabienne Baghdassarian, Gweltaz Guyomarc’h (éds.), Réceptions de 
la théologie aristotéliciennes d’Aristote à Michel d’Ephèse, Leuven, Leuvain-la-Neuve, 
Peeters, 2017, p. 108-123. 
Moraux, Paul, Der Aristotelismus bei den Griechen von Andronikos bis Alexander von 
Aphrodisias, I, Die Renaissance des Aristotelismus im 1. Jh. v. Chr., Berlin-New York, 
De Gruyter, 1973.  
Moreschini, Claudio, “Attico: una figura singolare nel medioplatonismo”, ANRW, 36 (1), 
1987, p. 477-491. 
Opsomer, Jan, “Demiurges in Early Imperial Platonism”, in Reiner Hirsch-Luipold (ed.), 
Gott und die Götter bei Plutarch, Berlin, De Gruyter, 2005, p. 51-99. 
Petrucci, Federico M., “ἀντέχεσθαι τῶν ῥεματων: The Neoplatonic Criticism of Atticus’ 
Exegesis of Plato’s Cosmology”, in Jens Halfwassen, Tobias Dangel, Carl O’Brien 
(eds.), Seele und Materie im Neuplatonismus – Soul and Matter in Neoplatonism, 
Heidelberg, Universitätsverlag, 2016, p. 75-103. 
Chiara Bonuglia 
 68 
Petrucci, Federico M., “Argumentative Strategies for Interpreting Plato’s Cosmogony: 
Taurus and the Issue of Literalism in Antiquity”, Phronesis, 61, 2016, p. 43-59. 
Petrucci, Federico M., Taurus of Beirut. The Other Side of Middle Platonism, London-
New York, Routledge, 2018. 
Praechter, Karl, “Die Philosophie des Altertums”, in Friedrich Ueberweg, Grundriss der 
Geschichte der Philosophie, Berlin, Mittler & Son, 1920. 
Sedley, David, “Plato’s Auctoritas and the Rebirth of the Commentary Tradition”, in 
Jonathan Barnes, Miriam Griffin (eds.), Philosophia Togata II. Plato and Aristotle at 
Rome, Oxford, Clarendon, 1997, p. 110-129. 
Sharples, Robert. W., Peripatetic Philosophy 200 BC to AD 200. An Introduction and 
Collection of Sources in Translation, Cambridge-New York, Cambridge University 
Press, 2010. 
Thévenaz, Pierre, L’âme du monde, le devenir et la matière chez Plutarque, Paris, Les Belles 
Lettres, 1938. 
Whittaker, John, Platonic Philosophy in the Early Centuries of Empire, ANRW, II, 36 (1), 
1987, p. 81-123. 
Zambon, Marco, Porphyre et le moyen-platonisme, Paris, Vrin, 2002. 
CHIARA BONUGLIA 
ILIESI-CNR / Università degli Studi di Salerno 
chiarabonuglia@gmail.com 
 
